University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 55
2022

Deprogramming Bias: Expanding the Exclusionary Rule to
Pretextual Traffic Stop Using Data from Autonomous Vehicle and
Drive-Assistance Technology
Joe Hillman
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law Enforcement and
Corrections Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joe Hillman, Deprogramming Bias: Expanding the Exclusionary Rule to Pretextual Traffic Stop Using Data
from Autonomous Vehicle and Drive-Assistance Technology, 55 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 959 (2022).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol55/iss4/7

https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.55.4.deprogramming
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

DEPROGRAMMING BIAS: EXPANDING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
TO PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOP USING DATA FROM
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE AND DRIVE-ASSISTANCE TECHNOLOGY
Joe Hillman*

ABSTRACT
As autonomous vehicles become more commonplace and roads become safer, this
new technology provides an opportunity for courts to reconsider the constitutional
rationale of modern search and seizure law. The Supreme Court should allow drivers to
use evidence of police officer conduct relative to their vehicle’s technological capabilities to
argue that a traffic stop was pretextual, meaning they were stopped for reasons other than
their supposed violation. Additionally, the Court should expand the exclusionary rule to
forbid the use of evidence extracted after a pretextual stop. The Court should retain some
exceptions to the expanded exclusionary rule, such as when there is a major public safety
concern. In the semi-autonomous world, the Court has the opportunity to adopt a more
expansive vision of Fourth Amendment protections and, in doing so, help remedy the
issue of racial profiling in traffic stops.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 960
I. BACKGROUND ...............................................................963
A. Reasonable Suspicion, Probable Cause, and Traffic Stops ........963
B. Autonomous Vehicle Technology.................................... 968
II. OBJECTIVE SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS CONFLICT WITH SUBJECTIVE
SUSPICION .................................................................. 970
A. Increased Driver Suspicion of Pretextual Traffic Stops............ 971
B. “Reasonable” Suspicion is Not a Sufficient Solution...............975
C. Restoring Carroll is Infeasible and Ultimately Unhelpful ........976
D. The Meaningful but Limited Value of State Legal Reform ........977
III. ALLOWING OBJECTIVITY INTO SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW .........978
A. Objective Components Added.........................................978

* J.D. Candidate, May 2023, University of Michigan Law School. Special thanks goes to Maddie
McFee for her guidance and support throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank Erik
Bubolz for his editing chops, and Jacob Shapiro and Clayton Fulton for helping me refine my topic.
Above all, I want to thank my parents for always supporting my education.

959

960

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 55:4

B. The Expanded Exclusionary Rule is Not Limitless ............... 980
C. Workability and the Intent of the Founders Support the Proposed
Change ..................................................................983
CONCLUSION...........................................................................985
INTRODUCTION
The majority of police interactions with civilians nationwide occur
during traffic stops. 1 Traffic stops, though common, can go awry and
turn deadly. All too often, traffic stops are predicated by racial profiling. 2 For example, a St. Anthony police officer justified a traffic stop of
Philando Castile based on Castile’s alleged resemblance to a robbery
suspect, a resemblance that was based on racially coded language. 3 The
current moment is one of increased public attention towards criminal
justice reform. In the eighteen months following George Floyd’s death,
thirty states and the District of Columbia passed policing reform. 4 Despite this, much work remains to be done and it is an appropriate time
to examine how technological advancements—particularly the emergence of autonomous vehicles and driver assistance technologies—can
contribute to a safer and more equitable criminal law landscape.
Restricting the use of traffic stops—which have increased due to
the use of the technologies outlined above—could help remedy issues of
racial profiling, a practice that persists despite current reforms aimed

1. ELIZABETH DAVIS, ANTHONY WHYDE & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., BUREAU OF
JUST. STATS., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, 1 (2018), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content
/pub/pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/X25H-82D6].
2. See Chris Horn, Racial Disparities Revealed in Massive Traffic Stop Dataset, U. OF S.C. (June 12,
2020), https://sc.edu/uofsc/posts/2020/06/racial_disparities_traffic_stops.php#.YavhVC-B2Rs
[https://perma.cc/6TFY-698F].
3. See Madison Park, The 62-Second Encounter Between Philando Castile and the Officer Who Killed
Him, CNN (May 30, 2017, 12:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/30/us/philando-castile-shootingofficer-trial-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc/32Z6-T8DW]; Andy Mannix, Police Audio: Officer
Stopped Philando Castile on Robbery Suspicion, STAR TRIB. (July 12, 2016, 7:55 PM), https://www.star
tribune.com/police-audio-officer-stopped-philando-castile-on-robbery-suspicion/386344001/
[https://perma.cc/T4ZL-LP4C]. Note the police officer’s reliance on Castile’s “wide-set nose” that
was said to match that of the robbery suspect. Mannix, supra note 3.
4. Ram Subramanian & Leily Arzy, State Policing Reform Since George Floyd’s Murder, BRENNAN
CENT. FOR JUST. (May 21, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/statepolicing-reforms-george-floyds-murder [https://perma.cc/9946-KBZQ]; see also Michael N. Herring &
Jenny Roberts, George Floyd’s Death Started with an Arrest for a Misdemeanor. Petty Crime Needs a Rethink.,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2021, 2:07 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/george-floyd-s-deathstarted-arrest-misdemeanor-petty-crime-needs-ncna1260258 [https://perma.cc/NPS4-ASV9].
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at curtailing police violence. 5 In fact, the reduction in police stops of
pedestrians serves as a successful model for meaningful criminal justice
reform. 6 After New York City’s liberal stop-and-frisk policy ended in
2014, the city did not see an increase in crime 7 and was safer than it had
been at any point in the preceding twenty-five years. 8 Since then, major
crimes have continued to decline in the city, 9 supporting the view that
decreasing police presence will lead to fewer arrests and help to remedy
America’s mass-incarceration problem. 10
Racial profiling is also well-documented in traffic stops. 11 One study
of police stops on the New Jersey Turnpike found that while Black and
white drivers broke traffic laws at similar rates, Black drivers accounted
for 46.2% of stops which represented a “statistically significant dispari-

5. See Lynne Peeples, What the Data Say About Police Brutality and Racial Bias—and Which Reforms Might Work, NATURE (June 19, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01846-z
[https://perma.cc/2WS6-76N5]; see also Domenico Montanaro, Where Views on Race and Police Stand a
Year After George Floyd’s Murder, NPR (May 17, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/05/17
/996857103/poll-details-the-very-different-views-of-black-and-white-americans-on-race-and-p
[https://perma.cc/D9V2-FC94].
6. Racial profiling in policing is well-documented and particularly infamous in the context
of police searches of pedestrians. See Russell L. Jones, Terry v. Ohio: Its Failure, Immoral Progeny, and
Racial Profiling, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 511, 536 (2018). From January 2004 to June 2012, the New York City
Police Department stopped 4.4 million pedestrians. In over half the cases, the police officer proceeded to preemptively frisk for weapons. Id. at 537. Though Black individuals make up 23% of New
York City’s population, they accounted for 52% of all “stop-and-frisks” and were 30% more likely to
be arrested following a stop than white New Yorkers. Id. at 537–38. Similarly, a 2015 study of stopand-frisks in Philadelphia showed that even after non-racial variables were controlled for, Black
individuals were more likely to be stopped by police. David Rudovsky & David A. Harris, Terry
Stops and Frisks: The Troubling Use of Common Sense in a World of Empirical Data, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 501,
536–37 (2018).
7. James Cullen, Ending New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Did Not Increase Crime, BRENNAN CENT. FOR
JUST. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/ending-new-yorksstop-and-frisk-did-not-increase-crime [perma.cc/7FEM-73AR].
8. Id.
9. See Neil MacFarquhar, Murders Spiked in 2020 in Cities Across the United States, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2021, 7:37 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/27/us/fbi-murders-2020-cities.html
[https://perma.cc/2DHX-WU48]. Note that despite the increase in murders across the United
States during 2020, the number of other types of major crimes continued to decline.
10. S. REBECCA NEUSTETER, RAM SUBRAMANIAN, JENNIFER TRONE, MAWIA KHOGALI & CINDY REED,
VERA INST. OF JUST. GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF POLICE IN ENDING MASS INCARCERATION 36 (2019),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/gatekeepers-police-and-mass-incarceration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DDQ5-PCRY]. Note how New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy stained the reputation of its opponents and played a major role in the 2013 New York City mayoral race. See German
Lopez, Mike Bloomberg’s Stop-and-Frisk Problem, Explained, VOX (Feb. 25, 2020, 8:19 PM), https://
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/2/21/21144559/mike-bloomberg-stop-and-friskcriminal-justice-record [perma.cc/223E-8X5F]; Cullen, supra note 7.
11. See Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction
on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 660 (2002); Rudovsky & Harris, supra note 6, at 531; Milton
Heumann & Lance Cassak, Profiles in Justice? Police Discretion, Symbolic Assailants, and Stereotyping, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 911, 911–12 (2001).
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ty.” 12 Similarly, of all cocaine seized by law enforcement on I-95, 16%
came from stops of Hispanic drivers, who only account for approximately 5.3% of major cocaine dealers. 13 In Maryland, 28% of residents
identify as Black, but 40% of traffic stops involve Black drivers. 14 It is also common for state police departments to underreport their interactions with communities of color. 15 Given the successes in reducing the
number of pedestrian stops, it is clear that similar reforms targeted at
decreasing vehicle traffic stops can make a meaningful impact.
There is hope that technology can help remedy the issues of racial
profiling in traffic stops. 16 Some scholars believe that autonomous vehicles have the potential to dramatically reduce the frequency of traffic
stops, 17 while other scholars argue that, as autonomous vehicles reduce
human error, there will ultimately be fewer reasons to pull over cars. 18
Thus, in the future autonomous world, it will be less reasonable for police officers to conduct traffic stops without a warrant. 19 This reality potentially erodes the constitutional justification for traffic stops. 20 Yet a
world of fully autonomous vehicles is a long way off, leaving open the
question as to what reform in the interim should look like. 21
This Note contends that even in the semi-autonomous world where
fully and partially autonomous vehicles share the road, traffic stops can
largely be relegated to the past. Part I of this Note discusses the Fourth
Amendment constitutional standards of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause that justify traffic stops, and provides a brief overview of autonomous vehicle technology. Part II explores the way a semi-autonomous
world challenges the application of reasonable suspicion and probable
12. Rudovsky & Harris, supra note 6, at 531.
13. Gross & Barnes, supra note 11, at 704.
14. Id. at 662.
15. Id. at 678–82.
16. See Michael R. Smith, Depoliticizing Racial Profiling: Suggestions for the Limited Use and Management of Race in Police Decision-Making, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219 (2005). One interesting
example is an app called “Hello.” “Hello” is officer-designed to replace “face-to-face contact with
video conferencing technology” during traffic stops. Robert R. Furnier & Charlotte Anne Spencer,
Hello, Officer-A Proposal: Using Technology to Combat Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops, 45 N. KY. L. REV.
175, 177–78 (2018). Using “Hello,” officers can potentially mitigate escalation of force in policedriver interactions by removing any physical contact. Id. at 178. Even with the app, officers still have
the option to perform a traditional traffic stop when necessary. Id. at 179.
17. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars-Oh My! First Generation
Autonomous Cars in the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 663 (2015).
18. Rachael Roseman, Note, When Autonomous Vehicles Take over the Road: Rethinking the Expansion of the Fourth Amendment in A Technology-Driven World, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 32–33 (2014).
19. Glancy, supra note 17, at 663.
20. See id.
21. Eric Adams, Why We’re Still Years Away From Having Self-Driving Cars, VOX (Sep. 25, 2020,
3:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/9/25/21456421/why-self-driving-cars-autonomous-stillyears-away [perma.cc/JR9H-7VPQ].
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cause, specifically with the increased access to some objective vehicle
data as evidence that a traffic stop was pretextual. Part III proposes that
the Court should allow defendant drivers to use objective facts from
their vehicles and police conduct as evidence of pretextuality and that,
where a traffic stop is found to be pretextual, evidence from the ensuing vehicle search should be excluded.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
search and seizure. 22 Intuitively, one can imagine how this might apply
to real property or fixed personal property. For instance, most people
expect privacy from warrantless police interaction while in their home.
Similarly, when walking down the street, most people do not expect to
get stopped and detained by a police officer absent any observable or
suspected illegal activity. The required level of suspicion to search and
seize an individual is a key question in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and one that is particularly interesting in the context of cars using public thoroughfares, which blend the privacy of homes and the
public nature of walking on the sidewalk.
Section A of this Part explains the constitutional jurisprudence of
search and seizure law in the context of traffic stops. Specifically, Section A highlights the constitutional protection of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the exception of motor vehicles to that general rule, and the current two-part requirement for traffic stops and
ensuing searches. Section B of this Part provides an overview of autonomous vehicle technology and the potential impact of autonomous vehicles on road safety.
A. Reasonable Suspicion, Probable Cause, and Traffic Stops
Most case law on search and seizure revolves around what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 23 Where there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable . . .
subject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” 24 “Knowingly expos[ing]” oneself to the public, even in one’s home,
negates a reasonable expectation of privacy over the subject of that expo22.
23.
24.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. (Stewart, J., majority opinion) at 357.
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sure. 25 Alternatively, “even in an area accessible to the public,” one may
retain constitutional protections for some part of their person which
they “[seek] to preserve as private.” 26 For example, an individual using a
telephone booth “may rely upon the protections of the Fourth Amendment” to cover the content of their conversation, as the use of a phonebooth imputes a level of privacy in communication even if the user is
publicly visible. 27
The Court has long recognized an exception for cars. Police officers
can search a car without a warrant when there is probable cause that a
crime is occurring in connection with the car. 28 This originated in 1925
when the Court decided the watershed case Carroll v. United States, allowing two Prohibition agents to search the car of suspected bootleggers without a warrant. 29 The petitioning Carroll brothers were known
bootleggers who had even tried to sell alcohol to the Prohibition agents
two months before the stop in question. 30 The brothers had “escaped
observation” after that encounter. 31 Two months later, the agents found
the brothers driving between Detroit and Grand Rapids, a route traveled
by many bootleggers transporting contraband to and from Canada.32
Consequently, “the officers were entitled to use their reasoning faculties
upon all the facts of which they had previous knowledge in respect to the defendants.” 33 The Court found that “the facts and circumstances within
[the agents’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in
the automobile.”34
As originally articulated, Carroll set forth three required components
for its Fourth Amendment exception for automobiles: “(1) probable cause,
(2) a mobile vehicle, and (3) a requirement that in cases where securing a
warrant is practicable the police should not engage in a warrantless
search.” 35 In the absence of “exigent” circumstances that necessitate an
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 351–52.
27. Id. at 352.
28. Roseman, supra note 18, at 16–17; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146–47 (1925).
29. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 160.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 161 (emphasis added). Note how overinclusive the Court is in finding that travel between Detroit and Grand Rapids, Michigan’s two largest cities, contributes to the justification that
someone could potentially be a bootlegger.
34. Id. at 162.
35. Martin L. O’Connor, Vehicle Searches–the Automobile Exception: The Constitutional Ride from
Carroll v. United States to Wyoming v. Houghton, 16 TOURO L. REV. 393, 431 (2000).
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immediate search and seizure, police officers under the blackletter of
Carroll must get a warrant before searching a vehicle, 36 though in actuality the Court has given police officers more discretion in conducting
warrantless searches. 37 By 1996, the Court held that police officers were
authorized to search a car without a warrant merely on the suspicion
that the vehicle contained contraband. 38 This expansion of the Carroll
exception led Justice Stevens, dissenting in Florida v. White, to lament
that “exceptions have all but swallowed the general rule” favoring privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 39
While the Court cites Carroll to justify a more expansive warrantless
search power than is contemplated by the exigent circumstance requirement, scholars and judges generally believe that Carroll’s exception
is tethered to the innate mobility of cars, which merits the increased
police search and seizure powers. 40 The Court explicitly stated that “the
need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies” the Carroll holding. 41 Cars can move from one jurisdiction to another with relative ease and function as discrete pockets
of personal space that travel on public roads. Thus, the reasoning goes
that if cars are afforded the same protections as homes under the
Fourth Amendment, criminal actors could transport illegal substances
with relative ease. In such situations, it is impractical for police officers
to procure a warrant before every vehicle search, lest the suspect simply
drive away in the interim. The importance of mobility in traffic stop jurisprudence is best demonstrated by the fact that a police officer can
search a mobile home that is licensed for road use without a warrant if
there is probable cause, as the home’s mobility outweighs the deferential treatment homes generally receive under the Fourth Amendment.42
Carroll’s holding, however, cannot be explained solely by the fact that
cars are mobile. After all, a suspect on foot is mobile and can evade surveillance or capture just as a driver can drive away. Yet a pedestrian is
36. Id. at 398–99.
37. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799 (1982).
38. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).
39. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 569 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is also important to
note that, as Chief Justice Roberts observed in Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, when examining precedent, the Court will “take the decision on its own terms, not through gloss added by
a later Court in dicta.” 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2200 n.4 (2020). This may signal the willingness of the current Court to rediscover the original meaning of precedent.
40. See Alyssa Vallar, Comment, Robots on the Road: Fourth Amendment Implications of Stopping
and Searching an Autonomous Vehicle, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 587, 602 (2018); White, 526 U.S. at 564–
65; California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367
(1976).
41. White, 526 U.S. at 565.
42. Carney, 471 U.S. at 386.
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not entirely without Fourth Amendment protections. A pedestrian may
be subject to warrantless seizure only where they “knowingly [expose]”
themselves to the public and do not reasonably expect to preserve an
aspect of their privacy. 43 For example, one court has held that a police
officer cannot perform a body-cavity search on a pedestrian absent exigent circumstances. 44 Additionally, mobility is not always required for
warrantless car searches. For example, the Court does not require police officers to get a warrant to search a car that is immobilized at a police station, 45 even though there is no chance of the car driving itself
away. 46 Mobility, therefore, does not fully explain Carroll, nor does the
idea of reasonable expectation of privacy provide guidance, as a car is a
more private setting than a sidewalk.
Perhaps this apparent gap can be explained by the inherent danger
of cars, rather than their mobility. In Fourth Amendment cases regarding the use of force, the Court has routinely found that a police officer’s
use of deadly force was reasonable where a suspect attempted to flee in
a high-speed vehicle. 47 In contrast, deadly force is not reasonable when a
fleeing suspect poses a lower safety risk, such as in cases where the suspect runs away on foot. 48 The danger of evasive driving makes the use of
force reasonable, as neutralizing the driver could help prevent innocent
bystanders or police officers from getting injured or dying as a result of
the driver’s reckless maneuvering. Similarly, a police officer is constitutionally justified in pulling over a vehicle that swerves for a completely
innocuous reason, such as avoiding a squirrel, because swerving of any
kind may indicate impaired driving. 49
Regardless of the public policy rationale for the Carroll majority’s
deference to law enforcement, today’s Court still recognizes two constitutional requirements for any warrantless search and seizure of a vehicle: an officer needs 1) reasonable suspicion to stop the car, and 2) separate probable cause to search the car. 50 Probable cause has no strict
definition, but instead requires only “the kind of ‘fair probability’ on
which ‘reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians,’ would
believe a crime is occurring.” 51 Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
1992).
48.
49.
50.
51.

See supra text accompanying notes 23–27.
Foster v. Oakland, 621 F. Supp. 2d 779, 791 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
O’Connor, supra note 35, at 399–400.
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 766 (2014); Smith v. Frelund, 954 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985).
See Roseman, supra note 18, at 27; Vallar, supra note 40, at 612.
Vallar, supra note 40, at 604 n.144.
Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013).
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than probable cause, referring to an accumulation of innocent activity
that would allow a reasonable officer to draw a reasonable inference
that a crime is occurring. 52 For example, a court has held that, where an
individual is walking back-and-forth on a street and peers into the
same store window during each pass, a police officer can reasonably infer that the legal activities of walking and window shopping constitute
reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior. 53
Accordingly, there are three categories of constitutionally permissible traffic stops based on “reasonable suspicion.” 54 First, officers can rely on “prior extrinsic observation” where outside investigation increases
suspicion that an individual is conducting criminal activity. 55 Second,
officers can rely on tips from an informant, 56 incurring no liability if the
tips turn out to be incorrect. 57 Third, officers can have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on direct observations of the vehicle and
driver. 58
Because the Court holds reasonable suspicion and probable cause to
a subjective standard, 59 a driver has very little recourse to challenge the
constitutionality of a traffic stop. 60 A traffic stop will always be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, so long as the “police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” 61 Even where police
officers have a mistaken understanding or knowledge of applicable
laws, they can find safe harbor in their subjective understanding of the
law. 62 Some courts have found that any violation of the traffic code legitimizes a traffic stop, even when the stop is a pretext for investigation
of another crime. 63 Similarly, other courts have found that a police officer can stop a vehicle based on a given reason even if their real intent
is to investigate another crime, so long as during the stop the officer es-

52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
53. Id. at 22–23.
54. Roseman, supra note 18, at 27.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (finding an informant’s factually incorrect tip to
law enforcement gives law enforcement probable cause to search a home under a “totality-of-thecircumstances” test).
58. Roseman, supra note 18, at 33.
59. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813–14 (1996).
60. For an example of a successful challenge of a traffic stop, see Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979), where the Court held that police officers cannot pull a driver over for the express
purpose of checking the driver’s license.
61. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 (emphasis added).
62. See id.
63. United States v. Humphries, 504 F. Supp. 3d 464, 471 (W.D. Pa. 2020).
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tablishes probable cause that a crime is occurring.64 Reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” 65
Furthermore, passengers other than the driver have no Fourth
Amendment protections when a car is pulled over. 66 Under the brightline rule established in Rakas v. Illinois, passengers cannot claim an expectation of privacy when they enter someone else’s vehicle. 67 That rule
is based on the same reasonable expectation of privacy rationale that is
articulated in Katz. 68 The Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States,
however, recently reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment is meant to
protect privacy against “arbitrary power” and to “place obstacles in the
way of a too permeating police surveillance.” 69 Unfortunately, a jurisprudence entirely deferential to the subjective knowledge of police officers further justifies permeating surveillance.
The semi-autonomous world offers an opportunity to redefine
Fourth Amendment protections. Rather than the current regime which
affords a broad police power, a more tailored concept of search and seizure law is possible when autonomous vehicles make roads safer. The
future of safer roads, as the next Section explores, may come to pass
sooner with current technological advancements poised to change the
way people drive.
B. Autonomous Vehicle Technology
When discussing autonomous vehicles, one may think of portrayals
in fiction, such as the futuristic society of the Minority Report or the anthropomorphic Volkswagen Beetle Herbie (everyone’s favorite “love
bug”). 70 In reality, driving automation is neither fictional nor a far-off
fantasy, as widescale autonomous technology testing is currently underway. 71 SAE International, the global association of engineers, has

64. Whren, 517 U.S. at 806.
65. United States v. Arvizu, 524 U.S. 266, 277 (2014).
66. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 150 (1978).
67. Id. at 148–49.
68. See Vallar, supra note 40, at 589.
69. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) and United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
70. See Rudy Salo, Hollywood and Autonomous Vehicles: How Films, Cartoons and TV Shows Have
Shaped Our AV Biases, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rudysalo/2019
/10/10/hollywood-and-autonomous-vehicles-how-films-cartoons-and-tv-shows-have-shaped-ourav-biases/?sh=4ed54be3a760 [https://perma.cc/K2Y7-L5NJ].
71. Samantha Subin & Michael Wayland, Alphabet’s Waymo and GM’s Cruise Get California DMV
Approval to Run Commercial Autonomous Car Services, CNBC (Sep. 30, 2021, 4:46 PM), https://www.cnbc
.com/2021/09/30/waymo-and-cruise-get-california-dmv-approval-to-run-driverless-cars.html
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defined six levels of driving automation ranging from SAE Level 0 to
SAE Level 5. 72 Technology included in SAE Levels 0 to 2 is considered
“driver support features,” where the driver maintains constant supervision of the road. 73 Examples of driver support features are blind-spot
warnings (SAE Level 0), lane-centering technology (SAE Level 1), and
lane-centering technology coupled with adaptive cruise control (SAE
Level 2). 74 These driver support features are widely available today. 75
SAE Levels 3 to 5 correspond to “automated driving features.” 76 Examples of automated driving features include traffic jam chauffeuring
(SAE Level 3), local driverless taxis (SAE Level 4), and complete automation (SAE Level 5). 77 At SAE Level 3, a passenger may be required to take
over driving in specific situations as the system requests. 78 SAE Levels 4
and 5 require no driver, though SAE Level 4 vehicles may have a limited
geographic range. 79 Vehicle-to-vehicle communication, where various
autonomous vehicles can coordinate and share data, may also play a
role in creating fully autonomous roadways. 80 SAE Level 3 autonomous
vehicles may be available as soon as next year. 81
With current road safety concerns, it is not entirely surprising that
the Fourth Amendment allows police officers a wide latitude to rely on
their subjective understanding of a situation or the law when pulling
over vehicles. Each year in the United States there are 38,000 deaths
and 4.4 million serious injuries resulting from dangerous driving.82 If a
driver exhibits temporary erratic behavior, a police officer has an incentive to pull over the vehicle immediately, rather than wait and observe
the driver for continued issues. The risk of an impaired, reckless, or
negligent driver presents a major safety issue. Thus, autonomous vehi-

[https://perma.cc/HXV3-7A6J]; Andrew J. Hawkins, Cruise Gets the Green Light to Give Driverless
Rides to Passengers in San Francisco, THE VERGE (Sep. 30, 2021, 4:35 PM), https://www.theverge.com
/2021/9/30/22702962/cruise-waymo-california-dmv-autonomous-vehicle-permit.
72. SAE J3016 Levels of Driving Automation, SAE INT’L (2021), https://www.sae.org/binaries/content
/assets/cm/content/blog/sae-j3016-visual-chart_5.3.21.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PWU-WU28].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Yu Tu, Wei Wang, Ye Li, Chengcheng Xu, Te Xu & Xueqi Li, Longitudinal Safety Impacts
of Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control Vehicle’s Degradation, 69 J. OF SAFETY RSCH. 177, 177 (2019).
76. SAE J3016 Levels of Driving Automation, supra note 72.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Michael Taylor & Carly Schaffner, BMW 7 Series to Reach Level 3 Autonomy Next Year, FORBES
(Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/wheels/features/bmw-7-series-level-3-autonomy/ [https://
perma.cc/J3JV-KXKT].
82. Road Safety Facts, ASS’N FOR SAFE INT’L RD. TRAVEL, https://www.asirt.org/safe-travel/roadsafety-facts/ [https://perma.cc/DV3K-K3FR] (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
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cles have the potential to make the roads a safer place as they mitigate
human error, which is the cause of 94% of traffic accidents.
Some scholars question the potential safety benefits of autonomous
vehicles, doubting the ability of autonomous vehicles to minimize the
dangers of driving despite claims of their ability to mitigate human error. 83 In particular, some have safety concerns regarding current driver
support features, such as the potential for increased crash risk during
the rapid transitions from adaptive cruise control back to manual driving required in some situations. 84 Taken in the aggregate, however,
driver support features, automated driving features, and vehicle-tovehicle communication are all predicted to make driving safer by mitigating human error. 85 Autonomous vehicles are, by definition, more
predictable and less affected by the mental state of any one driver than
non-autonomous cars. As technological advancements like autonomous
driving continue to increase road safety, police should become less inclined to conduct traffic stops on the sole basis that a driver’s behavior
was cause for reasonable suspicion.
II. OBJECTIVE SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS CONFLICT
WITH SUBJECTIVE SUSPICION
In a world of autonomous vehicles and safer roads, some scholars
argue that the need and constitutional justification for traffic stops will
be outdated and thus police officers should be required to get a warrant
before searching a vehicle. 86 There is also limited scholarship arguing
that the Carroll doctrine would no longer allow for observation-based
traffic stops of autonomous vehicles, 87 and that the Rakas passenger
rule would not apply where there is no driver to begin with. 88 However,
the more immediate and difficult question is how search and seizure law

83. See, e.g., Lionel P. Robert, Jr., Are Automated Vehicles Safer Than Manually Driven Cars?, 34 AI
& SOC’Y 687 (2019); Self-Driving Vehicles Could Struggle to Eliminate Most Crashes, INS. INST. FOR
HIGHWAY SAFETY & HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INST. (June 4, 2020), https://www.iihs.org/news/detail
/self-driving-vehicles-could-struggle-to-eliminate-most-crashes [https://perma.cc/2SS8-GRXW].
84. Tu et al., supra note 75, at 186.
85. See Offer Grembek, Alex Kurzhanskiy, Aditya Medury, Pravin Varaiya & Mengqiao Yu,
Making Intersections Safer with I2V Communication, TRANSP. RSCH.: PART C, May 2019, at 3–4; see generally Chang Wang, Qinyu Sun, Zhen Li & Hongjia Zhang, Human-Like Lane Change Decision Model
for Autonomous Vehicles That Considers the Risk Perception of Drivers in Mixed Traffic, 20 SENSORS 2259
(2020).
86. See Glancy, supra note 17, at 665.
87. See Roseman, supra note 18, at 2.
88. See Vallar, supra note 40, at 589.
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applies to the semi-autonomous world, where cars ranging from SAE
Level 0 to 5 share the road.
This Part of the Note focuses on the conflict between increased road
safety in the semi-autonomous world and search and seizure law. Section A explains how individuals with driver assistance or autonomous
vehicle technology will have stronger evidence that a traffic stop was
pretextual—where a police officer cites one reason for the traffic stop
but is intending to investigate a separate crime. Then, Section B outlines why evidence that a traffic stop was pretextual will not be sufficient to change what factfinders believe to be “reasonable” under the
current reasonable suspicion regime. Next, Section C highlights the infeasibility of restoring the exigent circumstance standard that the Court
originally adopted in Carroll. Finally, Section D briefly explains why
state solutions to this problem are effective but insufficient to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment.
A. Increased Driver Suspicion of Pretextual Traffic Stops
As the roads become safer in the semi-autonomous world, there will
be less human error in driving. Thus, there will be fewer legitimate reasons to pull over vehicles. 89 Yet the potential for autonomous vehicles to
undermine the safety-based constitutional rationale for most traffic
stops relies on fully autonomous roads, as only then will police officers
lose the ability to claim, “I thought that the vehicle in question was nonautonomous.” In the interim, drivers of autonomous or driver-assisted
vehicles may have stronger evidence that a traffic stop was pretextual,
thus strengthening claims against unreasonable searches and seizures.
For example, location tracking and camera data could provide strong evidence that a vehicle was not speeding or did not swerve between lanes.90
Where such data negates a police officer’s explicit rationale behind the
traffic stop, the driver has an effective argument that the stop was based

89. See discussion infra Part II.B.
90. See Thomas J. Cowper & Bernard H. Levin, Autonomous Vehicles: How Will They Challenge Law
Enforcement?, LEB (Feb. 13, 2018), https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/autonomous-vehicleshow-will-they-challenge-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/WJ6S-PSU9]. See also Keith Barry, The
Cameras in Your Car May Be Harvesting Data as You Drive, CONSUMER REPS. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://
www.consumerreports.org/automotive-technology/the-cameras-in-your-car-may-be-harvestingdata-as-you-drive-a3473812015/ [perma.cc/L6WN-838K] (explaining how non-autonomous vehicles
can collect driver data).
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on pretextual motives. Even after a car accident, law enforcement can
often use vehicle data to objectively allocate fault between drivers. 91
If police officers retain unconstrained discretion in traffic stops in
the semi-autonomous world, 92 public trust may erode in law enforcement and the Court’s ability to protect constitutional rights. 93 This is
especially true given the Court has held police officers can pull over
drivers for minor traffic violations and then extend a vehicle search beyond the traffic violation conducted. 94
While autonomous vehicle technology is not infallible, 95 the current
subjective “reasonable suspicion” regime provides police officers with a
discretion that is too broad for even the non-autonomous world, 96 as
evidenced by rampant and unaddressed racial profiling. 97 The government interest in public safety is clear, but such a high level of discretion
violates the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to remedy “the concern
about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will
among a person’s private effects.”98 From the perspective of an individual driver, it may feel absurd to get pulled over for something the car did
when following its programming. Drivers from minority backgrounds
may be particularly frustrated if law enforcement retains a completely
discretionary power rooted in subjective suspicion to pull over vehicles
due to a historical practice of targeting minorities through these stops.99
This distrust and frustration can be exacerbated by the fact that police

91. See Patrick Hurtado, Implications of Self-Driving Vehicles, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (last accessed
Dec. 20, 2021, 7:58 PM), https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/implications-of-self-driving-vehicles/
[https://perma.cc/UQ45-PRFN].
92. See supra text accompanying notes 59–65.
93. For an argument that pretextual traffic stops are limited to avoid “bad faith,” see State v.
Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); see also Carla R. Kock, State v. Akuba: A Missed Opportunity to Curb Vehicle Searches of Innocent Motorists on South Dakota Highways, 51 S.D. L. REV. 152, 154
(2006) (arguing that allowing police officers to request consent for searches during routine traffic
stops is ultimately unjust).
94. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996); Brian J. O’Donnell, Whren v. United
States: An Abrupt End to the Debate Over Pretextual Stops, 49 ME. L. REV. 207 (1997).
95. See Keith Barry, Elon Musk, Self-Driving, and the Dangers of Wishful Thinking: How Tesla’s
Marketing Hype Got Ahead of Its Technology, CONSUMER REPS. (Nov. 11, 2021), https://www.consumer
reports.org/automotive-industry/elon-musk-tesla-self-driving-and-dangers-of-wishful-thinkinga8114459525/ [perma.cc/L6WN-838K].
96. This discretion is based in the idea that law enforcement outweighs privacy. See Whren,
517 U.S. at 818 (upholding “the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been broken
‘outbalances’ private interest in avoiding police contact.”). Cf., Mike McIntire & Michael H. Keller,
The Demand for Money Behind Many Police Traffic Stops, NY TIMES (Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.ny
times.com/2021/10/31/us/police-ticket-quotas-money-funding.html [https://perma.cc/VM4Z-AWSU].
97. See discussion supra Introduction.
98. Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).
99. See, e.g., David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997)
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officers may still be legally justified in committing a pretextual stop based
on mistaken knowledge of the applicable law or facts of the situation. 100
Drivers are not completely without recourse, but protective remedies are often inaccessible. Courts are supposed to suppress evidence
that is acquired through improper searches and seizures under the exclusionary rule, but there are numerous carveouts. 101 For example, the
Court in Rodriguez v. United States held that a police officer violated the
Fourth Amendment where, without reasonable suspicion, they extended an otherwise-completed traffic stop and used a drug-sniffing dog to
inspect the car. 102 On remand, however, the Eight Circuit affirmed the
criminal conviction because “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.” 103 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the defendant’s ensuing appeal. 104 Despite the police officer’s unconstitutional
search the defendant was still convicted, further demonstrating the
limits to remedies available to those subject to unreasonable search and
seizure. Also, the exclusionary rule does not even apply where there are
no criminal charges, leaving many more without recourse.
Additionally, while it is technically unconstitutional to base reasonable suspicion of a crime solely on an individual’s appearance, 105 police
find many loopholes around these protections. For example, a border
patrol agent violates the Fourth Amendment when they stop and search
a vehicle on the suspicion that its occupants are illegal immigrants
based solely on their appearance. 106 However, under federal jurisprudence, all a border agent would need to do to avoid a Fourth Amendment violation is cite an additional, unrelated rationale. Similar instances of profiling are even more rampant in the context of traffic
stops, but such blatant evidence of prejudice is often not available, leaving most racial profiling out of the scope of the exception to the deference afforded to law enforcement. As even minor traffic violations constitutionally justify a traffic stop, there is effectively little check on pretextually prejudiced search and seizure.
While some states have more thorough protections, such protections are not uniformly guaranteed. For example, the New Mexico Court
100. See United States v. Humphries, 504 F. Supp. 3d 464, 470 (W.D. Pa. 2020).
101. Margaret M. Lawton, The Road to Whren and Beyond: Does the “Would Have” Test Work?, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 917, 920–22 (2008).
102. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 348 (2015).
103. United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.3d 1222, 1223 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Davis v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423–24 (2011)).
104. Rodriguez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1514 (2016).
105. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87 (1975).
106. Id.
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of Appeals has held that pretextual traffic stops are not “constitutionally
reasonable” under the New Mexico state constitution. 107 In one case,
that Court held that a police officer’s actions were pretextual when he
performed a drug search after stopping the defendant for an apparent
seatbelt violation. 108 An Ohio court went further, finding that the exclusionary rule barred the admission of evidence obtained during a traffic
stop where the police officer mistakenly believed the conduct in question was unlawful. 109 These states have gone beyond the federal courts
in a way that better codifies the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
curtail the “unbridled discretion” of law enforcement. 110
Other states, however, mirror the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of search and seizure law. 111 Massachusetts courts generally do not consider subjective or pretextual intent in the content of drug searches in
traffic stops. 112 The Supreme Court of Iowa held that running a red light
justifies a traffic stop regardless of any pretextual motives. 113 The Court
of Appeals of New York enforces a similar rule. 114 While some states
protect citizens from pretextual traffic stops, state law protections vary
greatly. Yet when constitutional rights are at issue, it should not matter
in which state one lives or drives; protections should be for all. 115
Additionally, the exclusion of evidence is the Court’s “last resort,
not [their] first impulse,” 116 meaning that such a remedy for unreasonable search and seizure is highly disfavored even when justified. In the
semi-autonomous world, drivers will have access to much stronger evidence that a given traffic stop was pretextual or otherwise unjustified
based on data generated and stored by the vehicle. 117 From the police of107. State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
108. Id. at 156–57. Note that on appeal of that decision, the Supreme Court of New Mexico denied certiorari. State v. Ochoa, 225 P.3d 794 (N.M. 2009).
109. State v. Babcock, 992 N.E.2d 1215, 1219–22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
110. Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009).
111. See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 90 N.E.3d 767, 777–78 (Mass. 2018); State v. Brown, 930
N.W.2d 840, 854 (Iowa 2019); People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 640 (N.Y. 2001).
112. See Buckley, 90 N.E.3d at 873; Commonwealth v. Gervet, No. 20-P-1204, 2021 WL 4805267,
at *2–3 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 15, 2021); Commonwealth v. Shaw, No.20-P-246, 2021 WL 2589071, at
*5 (Mass. App. Ct. June 22, 2021).
113. Brown, 930 N.W.2d at 854.
114. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d at 640.
115. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–51 (1961) (incorporating Fourth Amendment search
and seizure protections to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). Cf. George C. Thomas
III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure,
100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 168–74 (2001) (arguing that the incorporation of the criminal procedure protections to states effectively undermined those protections when used in the federal context).
116. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
117. See Simon Wright, Autonomous Cars Generate More Than 300 TB of Data per Year, TUXERA (July 2,
2021), https://www.tuxera.com/blog/autonomous-cars-300-tb-of-data-per-year/ [https://perma.cc
/7SGM-9YKL]; see also Chris Mellor, Autonomous Vehicle Data Storage: We Grill Self-Driving Car Experts
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ficer’s perspective, however, not much will have changed externally.
This division between subjective suspicion and objective realities may
undermine trust in law enforcement and the Court’s ability to protect
constitutional rights. 118 Ultimately, vehicle data can challenge pretextual traffic stops and serve as an impetus to restrict current police power.
B. “Reasonable” Suspicion is Not a Sufficient Solution
New evidence of a police officer’s pretext is likely not enough to
change what constitutes “reasonable” behavior under the reasonable
suspicion standard. The standard is fundamentally based on a totality
of the circumstances in each case. 119 A flexible standard that “[rejects]
rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries” has the potential to adapt in an evolving world. 120 It is thus reasonable to assume that
as driver-assisted and autonomous vehicles gradually come to dominate the road, fact-finders can adjust and determine ex post whether a
traffic stop was reasonable based on the realities of technology at the
time. This approach, mirroring traditional common law, may eventually shift incentives to change police behavior ex ante.
Some criminal procedure scholars, however, doubt that “reasonableness” has the potential to turn something as normal as a traffic stop
into something relegated to rare situations. 121 It will be difficult to change
the perception of courts and drivers that police officers are practically
always allowed to pull over a car for any reason, whether pretextual or
based on mistaken observations or knowledge of the law. In other
words, “reasonable” may be too closely tied to the end result of normalizing of traffic stops, rather than to the actual standard of suspicion required of the police officer who conducted a vehicle search. Accordingly, even when technology changes, courts may naturally continue to
apply wide deference to police officers in Fourth Amendment cases. 122
About Sensors, Clouds… and Robo Taxis, BLOCK & FILES (Feb. 3, 2020), https://blocksandfiles.com/2020/02
/03/autonomous-vehicle-data-storage-is-a-game-of-guesses/ [https://perma.cc/34UC-NZAV].
118. See discussion supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
119. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 237 (2013).
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Keith S. Hampton, Stranded in the Wasteland of Unregulated Roadway Police Powers:
Can “Reasonable Officers” Ever Rescue Us?, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 499 (2004); see also Wayne R. LaFave, The
“Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 1843 (2004); Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2013).
122. For an example of how an idea with a clear meaning can shift to encompass concepts outside the original scope of the idea, see Conor Friedersdorf, How Americans Became So Sensitive to Harm,
THE ATL. (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/concept-creep/477939/
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Thus, what constitutes “reasonable” for many may simply be the current
police practices we see today.
Where a constitutional right is concerned, a common law approach
is inappropriate because slow evolution does nothing for those whose
rights are violated today. That is why the Supreme Court, though deferential to its precedent, has “often recognized [that] stare decisis is not an
inexorable command.” 123 In fact, stare decisis “is at its weakest when [the
Court interprets] the Constitution.” 124 The introduction of vehicle data
as evidence could be the impetus needed for the Court to readdress the
constitutionality of pretextual traffic stops that were legalized in Whren
v. United States. 125
C. Restoring Carroll is Infeasible and Ultimately Unhelpful
In an attempt to rediscover the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, there
are some experts who argue that the Court should once again enforce
the original exigent circumstance test from Carroll. 126 Under that test,
police officers are required to cite another factor that justifies skipping
the procurement of a warrant. Such factors could include a high likelihood that evidence may be disposed of before a warrant is procured, or
that the suspect could escape police surveillance before they are identified. 127 Under that system, warrantless searches are effectively relegated
to extraordinary situations with police officers bearing the burden to
explain why the facts merited a warrantless search. Traffic stops would
still occur, but there will no longer be an unconstrained doorway to search
the vehicle.
However, this proposal faces two issues. First, as long as the Court
defers to the subjective knowledge of police officers, they will continue
to find a safe harbor against Fourth Amendment claims. After pulling
over a vehicle, a police officer could cite a slew of exigent circumstances
based solely on their subjective knowledge. For example, a police officer

[https://perma.cc/X8EY-SBCA] (explaining the theory of “concept creep” in the context of what
constitutes “harm”).
123. Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty., and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478
(2018) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 55 U.S. 223, 233 (2009)).
124. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).
125. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
126. See Di Jia, Katlee Spooner, & Rolando V. Del Carmen, An Analysis and Categorization of U.S.
Supreme Court Cases Under the Exigent Circumstances Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 27 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 37, 60–61 (2016) (arguing that the issue with current search and seizure law
revolves around the application of the exigent circumstance requirement).
127. O’Connor, supra note 35, at 431.
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can claim that they smelled marijuana and that allowing the driver to
leave would have also allowed the driver to dispose of the relevant evidence. 128 An exigent circumstance test then becomes the same deferential standard that the Court uses for pretextual traffic stops, allowing a
police officer to cite irrelevant reasons after the fact to avoid violating
the Fourth Amendment in the moment.129
Second, the Court has been hostile to any attempt at reestablishing
an exigent circumstances test for vehicle searches. 130 When “the relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable,” 131 the Court does not adhere to the
“cardinal principle” of the Fourth Amendment. 132 Accordingly, any remedy to search and seizure violations in the semi-autonomous world requires going beyond the current reliance on police subjectivity in establishing the record of a given case. Allowing defendants to present vehivehicle data afforded by autonomous cars would allow defendants to
bring more objectivity into such legal disputes.
D. The Meaningful but Limited Value of State Legal Reform
As previously discussed, some states have adopted more protective
search and seizure rules. 133 These reforms have tangible benefits, such
as curtailing racial profiling in traffic stops 134 and reducing the number
of searches of otherwise innocent drivers. 135 Yet where states have
adopted these reforms, they often view the changes as going above and
beyond the federal Constitution. For example, New Mexico has explicitly construed its state constitution to “provide broader protections than
are available under the Fourth Amendment.” 136 While state-level reforms have value, the protection of fundamental constitutional rights
should not depend on the state in which one resides or drives.

128. See, e.g., State v. Vega, 116 N.E.3d 1262, 1266 (Ohio 2018); United States v. Champion, 609
F. App’x 122, 125 (4th Cir. 2015). Cf. United States v. Fennell, 312 F. Supp. 3d 568, 574 (W.D. Tex.
2018).
129. Jia et al., supra note 126, at 61 (stressing that “officials need only probable cause showing
that contraband is located in the vehicle to search without a warrant.”).
130. O’Connor, supra note 35, at 433–34.
131. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) (emphasis added).
132. O’Connor, supra note 35, at 434.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 107–10.
134. See Anthony J. Ghiotto, Traffic Stop Federalism: Protecting North Carolina Black Drivers from the
United States Supreme Court, 48 U. BALT. L. REV. 323, 342–49 (2019).
135. See Carla R. Kock, State v. Akuba: A Missed Opportunity to Curb Vehicle Searches of Innocent
Motorists on South Dakota Highways, 51 S.D. L. REV. 152, 189–91 (2006).
136. State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 152 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
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The semi-autonomous world, with increased road safety, exposes
the tensions underlying search and seizure law, namely the division
between drivers with objective knowledge that their vehicles were
complying with traffic laws and the Court’s deference to police officers’
subjective viewpoints on facts and law. While what the Court views as
reasonable may slowly shift over time, most scholars do not believe this
will facilitate the urgently needed changes to search and seizure law.
Restoring the exigent circumstances test from Carroll is unlikely to resolve the problem and is a jurisprudential longshot given the expressed
mood of the Court. State reforms show more promise, but do not
guarantee the protection of everyone’s Constitutional rights. However,
the Court could expand protections by allowing objectivity into Fourth
Amendment analysis.
III. ALLOWING OBJECTIVITY INTO SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
The semi-autonomous world provides a perfect opportunity to reexamine the constitutional underpinnings of traffic stops and make appropriate changes that adhere to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
In the semi-autonomous world, Courts should expand the exclusionary
rule to pretextual stops by allowing defendant drivers to raise objective
facts that demonstrate that a traffic stop was pretextual. Specifically,
the Court should allow a defendant driver to use their vehicle’s technology and police officer actions as evidence of pretextual motives.
This Part of the Note explains how that expansion of the exclusionary rule would work. First, Section A highlights how a defendant driver
would utilize evidence of their vehicle’s technology and police officer
conduct as evidence that a traffic stop was pretextual. Then, Section B
explains how and when the exclusionary rule would apply to those classes of pretextual traffic stops. Finally, Section C explains how the expanded exclusionary rule for traffic stops is workable and appropriate
in the semi-autonomous world.
A. Objective Components Added
Drivers in the semi-autonomous world should be able to use their
vehicle’s technology as evidence that a traffic stop was potentially pretextual. To do so, a driver would first present evidence of their vehicle’s
capabilities and proof that those capabilities were in use at the time of
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the stop. 137 A jury or judge would then be allowed to take that evidence
into account when deciding whether the traffic stop was pretextual. If
the factfinder decided that the search was pretextual, then the court
should exclude evidence from the ensuing vehicle search at the trial or
bench hearing. For example, where an officer cites erratic driving or
speeding as the justification for the initial traffic stop 138 but a driver can
point to data from their driver-assisted or autonomous vehicle to refute
that claim, the factfinder can consider such evidence when determining
whether a stop was pretextual. While workability concerns are addressed in-depth below, it is important to note that some states already
successfully allow factfinders to determine if a traffic stop is pretextual
based on objective evidence beyond a driver’s actions. 139
Similarly, the Court should allow a defendant driver to use evidence
of police conduct to establish pretextual motives of a traffic stop. The
following are two examples of objective police conduct in the semiautonomous world that could potentially factor into claims of pretextuality. First, assuming an officer can run a license plate to determine
whether a vehicle is autonomous or driver-assisted, there could be an
obligation on police officers to check the status of a vehicle before conducting a traffic stop based on “public indicia of impaired driving.”140
Second, when it becomes clear that the vehicle that performed an erratic or dangerous action is autonomous, police officers would likely need
to observe the repetition of illegal driving or continuous issues like
swerving back and forth before pulling over the vehicle. If this were required, the driver could present proof in court that the officer did know
that the car was driving autonomously and therefore there was no nonpretextual reason to be pulled over.

137. See Paul Hightower, Independent Thinking: Why the “Black Box” is Needed for Autonomous Vehicle
Deployments, MACH. DESIGN (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.machinedesign.com/mechanical-motionsystems/article/21836355/independent-thinking-why-the-black-box-is-needed-for-autonomousvehicle-deployments [https://perma.cc/3WFB-FB24] (highlighting the potential value of an equivalent
to flight data recorder for autonomous vehicles).
138. Under the current reasonable suspicion standard, erratic or illegal driving is not an inherent
requirement; as Vallar notes, “repeated weaving within a single lane alone might not give an officer
enough reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, but driving need not be erratic, unsafe, or illegal in
order to generate reasonable suspicion.” Vallar, supra note 40, at 612 n.216.
139. See discussion infra Part III.C and discussion supra Part II.D. (New Mexico Courts weigh
the reasoning behind the traffic stop and the rationale of the ensuing vehicle search. Ohio Courts
can use a police officer’s mistake of law as evidence of pretext).
140. See Vallar, supra note 40, at 612. Vallar notes that where a vehicle acts erratically or dangerously “reasonable suspicion is not negated merely because the vehicle is an AV.” Id. To expand
Constitutional protections under the Fourth Amendment in the semi-autonomous world, therefore, it is important to normalize and require, where feasible, police conduct such as running license plates to better comprehend the technology of a given vehicle.
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Allowing drivers to bring in evidence of police conduct and their vehicle’s technology will allow for a more holistic and thorough trial. If the
factfinder determines a traffic stop was pretextual, the exclusionary
rule will apply and evidence from the ensuing vehicle search would be
excluded from trial. The benefit to public trust in the police and judiciary is evident: defendant drivers would feel like they have some recourse against pretextual and otherwise unreasonable traffic stops. Additionally, over time, police officers could adjust course and be more
conservative in pursuing unnecessary traffic stops to better align their
behavior with a jurisprudence that is more protective of Fourth
Amendment rights. This is not to say all evidence from a pretextual
traffic stop would always be excluded, but rather police officers would
need to satisfy a higher burden of proof to justify a vehicle search ensuing from a pretextual traffic stop.
B. The Expanded Exclusionary Rule is Not Limitless
Fundamentally, probable cause “is not a high bar.” 141 It “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual
showing of such activity.”142 In determining whether an officer had
probable cause for a search and seizure, the Court “[examines] the
events leading up to the arrest, and then decides “whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to probable cause.” 143 The above proposal to add objective components to the exclusionary rule as it applies to traffic stops effectively creates a heightened probable cause for pretextual traffic stops
in the semi-autonomous world.
Facially, the line of inquiry for this heightened requirement would
remain the same. The Court would still start by considering “the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,” 144 but the “reasonable”
inquiry would now explicitly take into account the realities of the semiautonomous world. This departs from the present reliance on factfinders to slowly transform what constitutes “reasonableness,” which would
require a long and uncertain evolution of the term, 145 in that the Court
would proactively shift the reasonableness standard. In doing so, the
141. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quoting Kaley v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 1090, 1103 (2014)).
142. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–44 n.18 (1983).
143. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 586 (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) and Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).
144. Id.
145. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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Court would allow defendant drivers to introduce objective facts about
their vehicle’s technology and officer conduct that better incorporates a
holistic understanding of the reasonable suspicion that initiates a traffic stop. In response to the new rules, defendant drivers would have a
greater guarantee of their Fourth Amendment Constitutional rights. 146
That being said, the expanded exclusionary rule should not be construed to allow a defendant driver to avoid conviction for any crime
merely because of an officer’s pretextual motives. Police officers still retain their executive function to stop criminal activity that is evident during a pretextual stop. For example, if a police officer stops a vehicle and
then observes a crime occurring, such as hearing banging coming from
the trunk or seeing the driver holding an opened can of beer, they would
still be able to intervene without fearing that any prior pretext could
render the criminal immune from judgment. Where no search is needed
for the police officer to establish a new probable cause, the expanded exclusionary rule does not apply.
Similarly, police officers would still be able to respond to extreme circumstances of indicia of impaired driving. For example, if a police officer is following a driver for pretextual reasons and then the police officer witnesses the driver perform an evasive maneuver, then the police
still could, with reasonable suspicion, pull over the vehicle despite any
pretextual motives in the initial interaction. Even autonomous vehicles
may have such an evident malfunction as to merit a traffic stop. 147 These
limits on the expanded exclusionary rule align with the public safety
concern that permeates Fourth Amendment case law.
Additionally, the Court may want to address the potential that, in the
semi-autonomous world, vehicles can switch between autonomous or
driver-assisted mode and regular driving. However, the above standard
already considers that potential issue. If when running a license plate a
police officer is informed that a vehicle requires the driver to take over
in certain circumstances, then the factfinder can use that information
146. For an argument that a stricter search and seizure standard would benefit drivers, see
Ghiotto, supra note 134.
147. See Top Three Possible Dangers of Self-Driving Cars, VESTTECH (last visited Nov. 20, 2021),
https://www.vesttech.com/top-3-possible-dangers-of-self-driving-cars/ [https://perma.cc/J75XSNBU] (providing a cursory explanation of three potential safety issues with autonomous vehicles,
one of which is a software malfunction. A glitch could cause eradicate and dangerous driving,
which would merit a traffic stop); see also Rani Molla, Self-Driving Cars: The 21st Century Trolley Problem, VOX (Oct. 6, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/22700022/self-driving-autonomouscars-trolley-problem-waymo-google-tesla [https://perma.cc/3BUG-7FEQ] (explaining the issue of
programing autonomous vehicles to address balancing crashes); Automated Car Insurance: Everything
You Need to Know, CAR AND DRIVER (May 14, 2021), https://www.caranddriver.com/car-insurance
/a36433040/automated-car-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/VF4R-R2KA] (exploring the current impact of driver assistance technology on car insurance).
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to help determine whether a traffic stop was pretextual. A more complex issue occurs where a driver is knowingly misusing drive-assistance
or lower-level autonomous technology that qualifies as SAE Level 3 or 4,
as it would be difficult to objectively capture that fact. Yet the Court is
perfectly capable of performing a balancing test that takes into account
varying levels of vehicle technology and the need for some subjective police observation. 148
Further, these issues already exist under the current legal regime
and should not justify continued constitutional abuses as roads become
safer. Modern driver-assistance technology is unable to tell if its drivers
are capable of taking back control when they need to. 149 Arguably, this
type of abuse of driver-assistance technology is evidence that the safety
underpinnings of traffic stops remain true in the semi-autonomous
world. An expanded exclusionary rule, however, provides exceptions
that consider dangerous situations. Additionally, if a driver is incapacitated or otherwise unable to take back control of the vehicle, they will
not be able to pull the vehicle over anyway. Technological advances can
potentially remedy that issue if cars are programmed to pull over if a
driver attempts to forgo their responsibilities.
Continuing to disregard Constitutional rights, on the other hand,
would not solve the problem, nor is it worth the cost when the benefit is
only a theoretical increase in safety. The most realistic safety concern in
the semi-autonomous world is likely that changed incentives will foster
more reckless pedestrians. 150 It would be absurd to argue that increased
accidents caused by pedestrians justify the search and seizure of otherwise well-functioning vehicles. That would judicially create a national

148. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (applying a factually-intensive balancing test to issues of state laws that affect interstate commerce); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 321 (1976) (articulating a three-part balancing test for procedural due process claims against
administrative actions). While a bright-line rule may be easier to apply, the Court is capable of factually intensive balancing, such as in Pike and Mathews. According to Westlaw, Courts have cited
Mathews over 17,000 times and Pike over 1,700 times. Citing References for Pike v. Bruce Church
Inc., WESTLAW EDGE, https://1.next.westlaw.com (after opening the case on Westlaw, click the
“Citing Reference” tab directly above the body of the case); Citing References for Mathews v. Eldridge, WESTLAW EDGE, https://1.next.westlaw.com (after opening the case on Westlaw, click the
“Citing Reference” tab directly above the body of the case).
149. See Dave Vanderwerp, It’s Not Just Tesla: All Other Driver-Assist Systems Work Without Drivers,
Too, CAR AND DRIVER (Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.caranddriver.com/news/a37260363/driverassist-systems-tested/ [https://perma.cc/Y2CR-69L4] (explaining how current drivers misuse current driver-assist systems).
150. See Rodney Brooks, The Big Problem With Self-Driving Cars is People, IEEE SPECTRUM, (July
27, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-big-problem-with-selfdriving-cars-is-people [https://
perma.cc/Q94T-F3WL], and Revisionist History Podcast, I Love You Waymo, PUSHKIN, at 28:30 (June
24, 2021), https://www.pushkin.fm/episode/i-love-you-waymo/ [https://perma.cc/V3CM-R6LP].
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“stop-and-frisk” because police officers are afraid of pedestrians potentially walking dangerously.
C. Workability and the Intent of the Founders Support the Proposed Change
While the nature of police work and the complexities of the semiautonomous world justify some aspects of discretion to police subjectivity in search and seizure law, 151 there is evidence that the drafters of
the Fourth Amendment recognized a more expansive protection for
search and seizure than is explained by the Whren majority. 152 While the
often-cited James Madison’s draft of the Fourth Amendment merely
limited the use of “general warrants” that provided police officers an
unlimited power, 153 Madison’s draft was ultimately not adopted. 154 Instead, the Fourth Amendment was influenced by John Adams and others familiar with a more expansive interpretation of search and seizure
protections common to Massachusetts. 155 In fact, “[although] Adams
and our other forefathers struggled to establish exactly what the proper
standards were, objective criteria to measure the propriety of a search and
seizure that persisted from case to case was the goal.” 156
Despite the intention of the Fourth Amendment’s drafters to consider objective facts, the Court has cited workability issues as a reason
for not expanding constitutional protections for pretextual traffic
stops. 157 There is a fear that courts will not be able to properly handle
traffic stop cases if the Court adopts a rule that is more protective of
constitutional rights. These fears, however, seem unfounded as various
states have already adopted more rigorous protections from pretextual
traffic stops without problems. 158 A heightened probable cause standard
151. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
152. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86
IND. L.J. 979, 1061 (2011).
153. Id. at 1046.
154. Id. at 1047–48.
155. Id. at 1061.
156. Id. (emphasis added); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: NowForgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of
Law”, 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 221–24 (2007) (arguing that current search and seizure doctrine is not in line
with the original intent of the Fourth Amendment, but that “[t]oo much has changed” to go back to
that old standard).
157. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (arguing that Petitioner in that case
failed to identify a workable standard and a reason to go beyond the traditional common law rule
that probable cause justifies a warrantless search and seizure).
158. See discussion supra Part II.A on page 972. This is similar to the Court’s fear of “anarchy”
that prevented the codification of a heightened standard for religious liberty cases in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). Yet despite the fear of anarchy many states have success-
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is thus workable, negating the rationale of the Whren majority which
forbade any prohibition on pretextual traffic stops under the Fourth
Amendment.
Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion of the Court in Whren, 159
also dissented in Navarette v. California where the Court held that an informant’s factually incorrect tip of a drunk driver justified pulling over
a vehicle that exhibited no evidence of driver impairment. 160 The majority reasoned that a drunk driver may have adjusted course and comported themselves well when a police car came into view. 161 Justice Scalia retorted “[that] is not how I understand the influence of alcohol. I
subscribe to the more traditional view that the dangers of intoxicated
driving are the intoxicant’s impairing effects on the body—effects that
no mere act of the will can resist.” 162 Under current search and seizure
doctrine, there is effectively a presumption that one is driving drunk
until they otherwise prove they are sober. 163 This absurd result is an example of doctrinal inertia, where the court-enforced doctrinal dance
overtakes the spirit of the relevant Constitutional provision. 164
Yet, technological change has always been a major contributor to
the evolution of how the Court interprets Constitutional rights. 165 Such
changes highlight “the dangers of doctrinal obsolescence: the perpetuation of rules and principles that do not sensibly fit the world that we
currently inhabit.” 166 Accordingly, in the semi-autonomous world, the
Court will have the opportunity to make sure jurisprudence matches
both the realities of driving and the spirit of the Fourth Amendment as
articulated by the amendment’s drafters. Just as Scalia found the
Navarette majority misunderstood intoxication, the current Court misunderstands the well-observed issue of pretextual traffic stops, especially as those stops allow for rampant racial profiling.
Allowing defendant drivers to use their vehicle’s technology and associated police conduct as evidence of a pretextual traffic stop is workafully adopted and implemented a heightened standard. See Lucien J. Dhooge, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act at 25: A Quantitative Analysis of the Interpretive Case Law, 27 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153
(2018); Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163
(2016).
159. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
160. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014).
161. See id. at 398–99.
162. Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. See Christopher D. Sommers, Presumed Drunk Until Proven Sober: The Dangers and Implications of Anonymous Tips Following Navarette v. California, 60 S.D. L. REV. 327 (2015).
164. David S. Han, Constitutional Rights and Technological Change, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 71, 106
(2020).
165. Id. at 130.
166. Id.
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ble and allows defendant drivers to have more faith in the judicial process.
Expanding the exclusionary rule to such cases further increases the perception of fairness in search and seizure and provides recourse that can
help remedy racial profiling in traffic stops by limiting unnecessary traffic
stops. Allowing some exceptions to the expanded exclusionary rule addresses public safety concerns. Fundamentally, the semi-autonomous
world will allow for such a revolution in search and seizure law that better adheres to the original intent of the Fourth Amendment. 167
CONCLUSION
Current Fourth Amendment search and seizure law contributes to racial profiling in traffic stops as it provides substantial discretion to police officers’ subjective viewpoints. This standard makes sense given the
public safety issues inherent with driving. But as driver-assistance and
autonomous vehicle technologies become common, public safety issues
will begin to subside. Accordingly, the semi-autonomous world provides a perfect opportunity for the Court to better embody the spirit of
the Fourth Amendment. To do so, the Court should allow defendant
drivers to use their vehicle technology and corresponding police conduct as evidence of pretextual motives. Where a factfinder concludes a
traffic stop was pretextual, evidence from an ensuing search should be
excluded. Expanding the exclusionary rule will hopefully discourage
police officers from conducting unnecessary traffic stops altogether.

167.

See Clancy, supra note 152, at 1061.

